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ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE: A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH
SuBJecr TO certain important exceptions,' a land occupier is not liable
for harm to trespassers caused by his failure to put the land in a
reasonably safe condition for their entry or to carry on his activities so
as not to endanger them.' Among these exceptions is the attractive
nuisance doctrine
In those jurisdictions which accept the attractive nuisance doctrine,4
'RESTATEMENT, ToRTS §§ 334-339 (1934)-
'Id. § 333.
'Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (873), was the first
case to articulate the doctrine in this country, although the Court cited two, Connecticut
cases, Birge v. Gardiner, 19 Conn. 507 (1849) and Daley v. Norwich & W.R.R., 26
Conn. 591 (1858), and Lynch v. Nurdin, I QB. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1o41 (141), as
"authorities" for its decision.
The term attractive nuisance belies the true nature of the doctrine in that it is not
necessary for liability that the instrumentality or condition be a nuisance in the legal
sense or that the trespass be induced by its attractiveness. The term arose as a result
of the now dicarded "invitation" or "allurement? requirement. See note 23 infra.
See RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 339 (1934).
See generally 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 29 (1950) ; 38 Am. Jur. Negligence §§ -42-
157 (1941) ; Annot., 36 A.L.R. x, 34 (19±5); Annot-, 39 A.L.R. 482, 486 (925)
Annot., 45 A.L.R. 982 (1926) 5 Annot., 53 A.L.R. 1328, 1344 (1928)5 Annot.,
6o A.L.R. 1424, 1444. (1929). See also PROSSER, TORTS § 76, at 438-445
(2ded. x955) i 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.5 (1956); Eldredge, Tort
Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L.Q 32 (1937); Green, Landowner v.
Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility It; Tort, 21 MICH.
L. REV. 495 (1923)i Green, Landowners' Responsibility to Children, 27 TEXAS
L. REV. 1 (1948) ; Hudson, The Turntable Cases In the Federal Courts, 36 HARv. L.
REV. 826 (1923) ; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Tres-
tassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144. (1953); Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering
Without Permission, ii HARV. L. REv. 349, 434 (1898).
'The doctrine is still rejected by eight states. See PROSSER, TORTS § 76 at 439,
n.22 (2d ed. z955).
Various reasons have been asserted for rejecting the doctrine. It is argued that,
carried to an extreme, it would amount to insurance on children, Bottum's Adm'r v.
Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 At. 858 (1911) 5 that it shifts the duty of caring for children
from the parents to the public, Hannan v. Ehrlich, 1o2 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504
(192i) 5 that it impairs property rights, Uthermohlen v. Bogg's Run Mining & Mfg.
Co., 50 W.Va. 457, 40 S.E. 410 (igO); Nelson v. Burnham & Morrill Co., 114. Me.
213, 95 Ad. 1o29 (1915); and that the entire concept is founded on sympathy rather
than sound legal principles, Nelson v. Burnham & Morrill Co., supra; Thompson v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 218 Pa. 444, 67 Atl. 768 (1907)5 Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks,
supra.
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it is traditionally restricted 5 in application to those artificial 6 instru-
mentalities and conditions 'which present latent or hidden danger.7
There is substantial agreement that the doctrine does not apply to such
"common and obvious" dangers as fires,' bodies of water,' and high
The courts of virtually all jurisdictions apply the doctrine cautiously, fearful of
unrestricted imposition upon the rights of the land occupier. See United Zinc & Chem.
Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922); Alligator Co. v. Dutton, io9 F.2d 9oo (Sth Cir.
1940 ) ; Lake v. Ferrer, 139 Cal. App.zd 114, 293 P.zd io4 (1956) ; Burns v. Chicago,
338 Ill. 89, 169 N.E. Sx (1929).
'It is generally held that the doctrine applies only to artificial conditions and
instrumentalities because it would place too great a burden upon the land occupier
to require him to guard against all natural conditions on his premises that offer a
threat of harm to trespassing children. Hunsche v. Southern Pac. R.R., 62 F. Supp.
634 (N.D. Cal. 1945)5 Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 40 Ariz.
282, 11 P.2d 839 (1932) ; Baugh v. Beatty, 9i Cal. App.2d 786, 205 P.2d 671 (949);
Hernandez v. Santiago Orange Growers' Ass'n, 11o Cal. App. 229, 293 Pac. 875
(1930) 5 McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E. 843 (1933); McComb City v.
Hayman, 124 Miss. 525, 87 So. 11 (1921).
'See Williams v. Bolding, 220 Ala. 328, 124 So. 892 (1929); Phipps v. Mitze,
116 Colo. 288, 18o P.zd 233 (i947); Erickson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry.,
x65 Minn. io6, 205 N.W. 889 (1925)5 Erickson v. Great Northern Ry., 8z Minn.
60, 84 N.W. 462 (190oo) Riggle v. Lens, 71 Ore. 125, 142 Pac. 346 (1914); McHugh
v. Reading Co., 346 Pa. 266, 30 A.2d 122 (1943); Ray v. Hutchinson, 17 Tenn. App.
477, 68 S.W.zd 948 (1933)5 Stimpson v. Bartex Pipe Line Co., 12o Tex. 232, 36
S.W.2d 473 (1931)i Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254
N.W. 351 (1934).
It should be noted that latent or hidden danger in this context means danger which
would not be perceptible to a child although it might be readily apparent to an adult.
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 at 922 (1934).
8See Dunbar v. Olivieri, 97 Cobo. 381, 50 P.2d 64 (1935); Goss v. Shawnee
Post No. 3204, V.F.W., 265 S.W.2d 799 (Ky. 1954); Erickson v. Great Northern Ry.,
note 7 supra. Conra, Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Lester, 219 Ark. 413, 242 S.W.ad 714
(.95).
The cases are collected in Annot., 27 A.L.R.zd *182, 1187 (1953).
The above cases involve openly flaming fires and are distinguishable from cases
involving injuries caused by hot ashes and cinders, which are characteristically highly
deceptive. Cf. Fitzmaurice v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 78 Conn. 406, 62 Atl.
620 (x9o5); Rush v. Plains Township, 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 2oo (1952); Cox v.
Ince, 274 S.W.2d 865 (Tex.Civ.App. 1954). See also Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 921, 930
(1955).
' Among the courts' reasons for refusing to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine
to natural and artificial bodies of water are the child's appreciation of the danger in
playing in and about the water, and the exorbitant cost and concomitant destruction
of the utility of the body of water if the land occupier is required to erect protective
barriers. See, e.g., Luallen v. Woodstock Iron & Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So.
182 (1938); Peters v. Bowman, x S Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896); Phipps v. Mitze,
116 Colo. 288, i8o P.2d 233 (1947); McCall v. McCallie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S.E.
843 (1933)5 Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491 (La. App. 1936); Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. v. Powers, 206 Okla. 322, 243 P.2d 688 (1952).
A few cases, however, have found reason to invoke the doctrine in those instances
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places.' 0 However, in two recent decisions, Simmel v. New Jersey
Coop Co.,," and Lorusso v. De Carlo,'2 the Supreior Court of New
Jersey has again rejected the prevailing rule and applied the attractive
nuisance doctrine to afford relief for injuries suffered by infants who
were burned in fires while trespassing upon the defendants' land.' 3
Historically, the courts hesitated to disturb the sanctity of the land
occupier's right to the exclusive possession and control of his property.' 4
in which some feature in or about the water has made it exceptionally inviting to
children. See, e.g., Allen v. William P. MacDonald Corp., 42 So.2d 706 (Fla. x949)
(white sand banks around the pond) City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39
N.E. 484 (1895) (logs and timbers floating about in the pond) 5 Kansas City v.
Siese, 71 Kan. 283, 8o Pac. 626 (19o5) (sewer pipes extended across the surface of
the water) i Saxton v. Plum Orchard, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949) (small
timbers in water).
10 Cf. Sanders v. Baird, i95 Ark. 535, 12 S.W.zd 966 (1938); Coon v. Kentucky
& Ind. Terminal R.R., x63 Ky. 223, 173 S.W. 325 (i915). See also RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 339, illustration 3, at 923 0934).
1t 47 N.J. Super. 509, 136 A.2d 301 (App. Div. 1957), reed, - N.J. -, 143
A.2d 52x (1958). The employees of the Department of Public Works of Hoboken
set on fire their daily collection of rubbish and left it burning unattended on the
defendant's vacant property. The four-year old plaintiff, who lived across the street
from the property in a housing project and often played on the defendant's property,
was seriously burned while playing near one of the fires.
12 48 N.J. Super. 112, 136 A.zd 900 (App. Div. 1957). As in the Simmel case,
a four-year old plaintiff was burned by a fire started by a third party on the de-
fendant's premises.
"In the Simmel case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently ordered a new
trial on the ground that the lower court had failed to instruct the jury correctly
concerning the requirement that the defendant have actual knowledge of the existence
of the fire.-N.J.-, 143 A.2d 521, 576 (.958).
In the Lorusso case, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's dismissal of
the plaintiff's action and ordered a new trial on the ground that it was for the jury
to decide whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the trespass would occur and that
the plaintiff would be injured.
Unlike the Simmel case, here the Appellate Division dealt with the child's insuf-
ficient intelligence and experience to appreciate the danger of fire. See also
Arkansas Valley Trust Co. v. Mcllroy, 97 Ark. 16o, 133 S.W. 8x6 (1915) i Hoff v.
Natural Refining Products Co., 38 N.J. Super. 222, ii8 A.2d 714 (App. Div. 1955).
Cf. RESTATEMiENT, TORTS § 339 comment c (1934)
, 
which notes that the age,
intelligence and experience of the trespasser are important factors in determining the
liability of the land occupier.
The doctrine does not extend, however, to children who recklessly encounter an
instrumentality, knowing it to be dangerous. See, e.g., Garrett v. Arkansas Power &
Light Co., 218 Ark. 575, 237 S.W.zd 895 (i95i) s Clark v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,
zz8 Cal. App. 344, 5 P.zd 58 (1931); Dennis' Adm'r v. Kentucky & W.Va. Power Co.,
258 Ky. io6, 79 S.W.2d 377 (1935); Hight v. American Bakery Co., 168 Mo. App.
431, 151 S.W. 776 (ip12). See also Eldredge, supra note 3, at 49; 23 MINN. L. REv.
241 (1938).
" In feudal England the land occupiers were sovereigns within their domains, even
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This veneration of land ownership depended upon notions of the
economic importance and social desirability of the free use and ex-
ploitation of land.1 So long as the country was predominantly agrarian,
there was no need for exception to the land occupier's traditional im-
munity from liability to trespassers, even infant trespassers.1" Increasing
industrialization and urbanization, however, brought about the realiza-
tion that there had to be some reconciliation between the land occupier's
interest in the exclusive use of his premises, free from any duty of
reasonable care toward trespassers, and the community's interest in the
safety of its children.17
In Sioux City R.R. v. Stout, 8 the United States Supreme Court
first recognized a duty on the part of the land occupier to refrain from
tolerating or maintaining dangerous artificial instrumentalities in loca-
tions where he has reason to expect children will trespass.'9 This
decision was at first rejected firmly by other courts2" because the theory
upon which it rested, that the land occupier owed a duty of due care to
infant trespassers, was repugnant to the land occupier's traditional posi-
tion in Anglo-American life.2 ' It was feared that the land occupiers
as to the king. Hence, there was no basis for imposing upon them any duty toward
trespassers. See ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 164 (.941).
15 James, supra note 3, at 146.
"For a concise history of the development of the law in this field see Green,
Landowner's Responsibility to Children, 27 TEXAs L. REv. i (1948).
"' "The doctrine represents a prudent and essential accommodation of the land-
owner's right to the use of his land and society's interest in the humane [sic] and the
protection of the life and limb of its youth and the individual's interest in personal
security. The correlative burden on the landowner, small in comparison to the
larger interests to be served, is a necessary concession to the common welfare." Strang
v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45, 86 A.2d 777, 780 (1952). See also
Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 23 A.7d 729 (1942). See Eldredge, supra
note 3, at 48; Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 120
18 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
"The Court, however, also cited three cases as "authorities" for its decision. See
note 3 supra.
' See Nelson v. Burnham & Morrill Co., 114 Me. 213, 95 At. xo29 (915);
Ryan v. Towar, iz8 Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644 (19o); Frost v. Eastern R.R., 64
N.H. 22o, 9 Atl. 790 (1887) Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R., 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E.
io68 (1895); Dobbins v. Missouri, K. &. T. Ry., 91 Tex. 60, 41 S.W. 6z (1897).
"It is believed to be the most remarkable instance in common-law jurisprudence of the
survival of a doctrine which has been condemned so vigorously by so many courts."
Green, Landowner's Responsibility to Children, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (-948).
"It has been said, "The opinion failed to grapple with the paramount conceptual
difficulty in the case, ...that lack of duty to use affirmative care towards trespasser."
James, supra note 3, at 16i.
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would become insurers of children's safety.22 Recognizing, however,
the essential justice of the result in the Stout case, the courts searched for
a more acceptable device for attaining the same result in similar cases.
The product of this search was the "invitation" or "allurement" con-
cept." Having thus elevated the child to the status of at least a techni-
cal invitee, the courts were then willing to impose liability upon the
land occupier on the theory that, by attracting or luring the child upon
his premises, he assumed a moral and legal duty of exercising due care
to protect the child.24
Fortunately, most courts have discarded the "invitation" or "allure-
ment" limitation and have come to accept the doctrine originally set
forth in the Stout decision. 25 The element of attraction is now important
Although various considerations prompted the courts to reject the doctrine, see
notes 4 supra and 22 infra, none was more important than the feeling that the Court
had ignored the long-standing rule that the land occupier owed no duty of due care
to trespassers, regardless of their age, intelligence, and experience. The inroad upon
his traditional immunity, which the Supreme Court proposed, was regarded by the
courts as unwarranted and dangerous to the land occupier's protected position. See
Green, Landowner's Responsibility to Children, 27 TExAS L. REV. 1 (1948).
" See Frost v. Eastern R.R., 64 N.H. 220, 9 At. 790 (1887).
"The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Keefe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R., 21
Minn. 207 (1875), was the first court to apply the fiction of an implied invitation to
the child due to the attractiveness of the instrumentality or condition, thereby evading
the "trespasser" label and removing the most objectionable element of the Stout decision.
"' Even the United States Supreme Court adopted the requirement of allurement or
invitation in United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, z58 U.S. 268 (1922). See also Salt
River Valley Ass'n v. Compton, 4o Ariz. 282, 11 P.2d 839 (1932) 5 Hayko v. Colorado
& Utah Coal Co., 77 Colo. 143, 235 Pac. 373 (i9:5); McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill.
4o, ioo N.E. i68 (19iz); Seymour v. Union Stock Yards & Transit Co., 224 Ill.
579, 79 N.E. 950 (go6).
See also Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 513, 52.6-27, 877 (93o-3).
"5 One reason for the abandonment of the "allurement" fiction was that it imposed
severe restrictions in cases where recovery by the injured child seemed the only
conscionable result. Thus, in United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922),
recovery was denied two boys who were poisoned by swimming in a pool of con-
taminated water located on the defendant's premises. The Court reasoned that be-
cause the plaintiffs did not see the pool until they had entered the defendant's land, it
could not be said that they were lured by the pool. See also Hayko v. Colorado &
Utah Coal Co., 77 Coo. 143, 235 Pac. 373 (1925). Such cases emphasize the failure
of some courts to recognize the justification for the doctrine, i.e., that the lives of its
children are usually of greater value to the community than the instrumentality
maintained by the defendant. z HARPEIER & JAMES, ToRs § 27.5, at 1450 (2956).
Some states, however, still cling to the invitation fiction. See Salt River Valley
Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 39 Ariz. 491, 8 P.2d 249 (1932); Esquibel v.
Denver, 112 Colo. 546, 15, P.2d 757 (1944)5 Harriman v. Incorporated Town of
Afton, 225 Iowa 659, 281 N.W. 183 (1938)5 Saxton v. Plum Orchards, zi5 La.
378, 40 So.zd 791 (1949); Shemper v. Cleveland, 212 Miss. 113, 54 So.zd 215
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only in so far as it may mean that the presence of the child is to be
anticipated.28 There remains the question whether courts should further
extend the attractive nuisance doctrine to include cases involving patent
risks of harm.
The instant cases are not the first in which New Jersey has per-
mitted recovery by an infant injured by fire. The New Jersey Court
of Errors and Appeals in i92o permitted recovery by a five-year old
child who was burned in a fire on the defendant's premises, not on the
attractive nuisance theory, but on the theory that the property owner
was negligent in the use of a "dangerous instrumentality.128  In 1952
the New Jersey Superior Court adopted the theory reiterated in the
instant cases and declared that New Jersey law permitted recovery
under the attractive nuisance doctrine for injuries resulting to children
from fire.-
By contrast, the courts of other jurisdictions maintain that the land
occupier has the duty to protect trespassing children from only those
dangers which they are unlikely to observe and appreciate"0 and that
the doctrine of the attractive nuisance has no application if in fact the
child appreciates or should appreciate the danger of a certain instrumen-
tality or condition. These courts hold that fire is among those "common
(is5); Wheeler v. City of St. Helens, 153 Ore. 61o, 58 P.zd 5o (1936)) Gouger v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 188 Tenn. 96, z16 S.W.2d 739 (1949)-
2 Eldredge, supra note 3, at 50. See also Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110, 193
Atl. 6o8 (x937) 5 Larson v. Equity Cooperative Elevator Co., 248 Wis. 132, 2
N.W.2d 253 (946).
" See Piraccini v. Director General of Railroads, 95 N.J.L. 1x4, 112 Adt. 311
(E. & A. 1920)5 Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., so N.J. Super. 486, 77
A.2d 5oz (App. Div. 295o), aff'd, 9 N.J. 38, 86 A.zd 777 (1952).
" Piraccini v. Director General of Railroads, supra note 7. The court declined
to follow the older rule enunciated in Harrington v. Griedanus, 1o N.J. Misc. 710,
16o AUt. 652 (Sup. Ct. 1932), that a landowner owed no duty to protect trespassers
against harm caused by his negligent conduct.
29 Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., io N.J. Super. 486, 77 A.zd 5o2 (App.
Div. 1950), aff'd, 9 N.J. 38, 86 A.zd 777 (195z). There the defendant's janitor had
built a small trash fire on the defendant's land, which was located near a playground.
The janitor left the fire unattended. The five-year old plaintiff was later found with
his clothes on fire. The court adopted the doctrine as formulated by the RESTATE-
MENT, TOMas § 339 (1934). Thus, the court firmly established that, given the
existence of those circumstances enunciated in the Restatement, a landowner has a duty
to protect a trespassing child. See also the later case of Harris v. Mentes-Williams, xx
N.J. 559, 95 A.2d 388 (1953). For a discussion of the doctrine see, Lubetkin, The
Attractive Nuisance Doctrine-Its Status in New Jersey, 8 RUrTGEts L. REV. 378
(1s).
3 0 See cases cited note 8 supra.
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and obvious" dangers which even very young children are capable
of appreciating and avoidinga' Furthermore, they assert that fire
is not a hidden or latent danger which creates an unreasonable risk of
harm for the unwary child3 2
Another factor in the refusal of these courts to allow recovery for
injury by fire is their frank recognition of the impossible burden which
would be placed upon the land occupier if he were required to guard
against every possible threat which conditions upon his premises pose
for trespassing children 3  As with bodies of water84 and high places,3 5
most courts have felt that the recognition of a duty to guard against
injury by fire would place upon the land occupier a burden outweighing
the risk of harm which fire creates.
In the Lorasso case the New Jersey court has rejected the position
of other jurisdictions as "unrealistic," on the theory that C... very young
children do not have the capacity to estimate or appreciate the danger
of playing around or with fire."38 Those New Jersey decisions granting
recovery to infants injured by fire under the older "dangerous instru-
mentality" rule undoubtedly weighed heavily in the resolution of the
instant cases. Nevertheless, it is worthy of note that the court has given
a breadth to the attractive nuisance doctrine denied by great weight
of authority. Thus the New Jersey court has committed itself to a
liberal approach which logically may expand the attractive nuisance
8 See cases cited note 8 supra.
'* See cases cited note 7 supra.
"It is not everything which may attract a child that can be regarded as an attrac-
tive nuisance, for there is no limit to the class of objects which may be attractive to
a normal child even though he be less than io years of age. Moseley v. Kansas City,
170 Kan. 585, 591, zS P.zd 699, 704 (1951). See also Hayko v. Colorado &
Utah Coal Co., 77 Colo. 143, 235 Pac. 373 (1925).
"' See cases cited note 9 supra.
REsTATEMENT, Toxrs § 3 9 9 d (1934), also lays down the requirement that the
utility of the instrumentality or condition to the possessor be slight as compared to
the risk to young children. This clause protects the landowner in certain instances
where the continued maintenance of the instrumentality or condition is in the public
interest. An apt illustration is provided by farm machinery. The Restatement
recognizes its inevitable danger "to children who meddle with it," but it also points
out its importance to agriculture and thus permits it to be maintained "if kept in a
proper place and condition2 RFsTATEMENT, To .s § 339, comment on cl. (d) (1934).
" See cases cited note 1o supra. "Surely, it would be an intolerable burden to re-
quire a landowner 'to guard every stairway, cellarway, retaining wall, shed, tree and
open window on his premises, so that a child cannot climb to a precipitous place and
fall off?" James, supra note 3, at x69.
"- N.J. Super. at -, 136 A.2d at 903.
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doctrine to include other patently dangerous artificial instrumentalities
and conditions.
Perhaps the rigid categorization of particular instrumentalities and
conditions as falling within or beyond the scope of the attractive nuisance
doctrine is not the most realistic solution to the problem8 7 It would be
difficult to show that liability should be imposed upon the land occupier
for injuries caused by any particular instrumentality or condition in all
imaginable fact situations."8 Undeniably in many cases the child would
or should appreciate the danger inherent in fire, and in such cases his
injuries should not be compensable. But any rule which holds that all
children in all instances should appreciate the danger inherent in such
conditions, thus making the nature of the condition itself the sole
criterion for determining the land occupier's liability, ignores the de-
sirability of a more flexible approach to the problem which would judge
the conduct of both parties by what is reasonable in the light of all the
circumstances. Such a plastic attitude is available under the rule of
the Restatement of Torts, 9 which gives appropriate weight in the
determination of each case to all the relevant circumstances, e.g., the
"' It has been pointed out that the law tends toward classification or categorization
because of "the repetition of sets of circumstances having certain common factors."
Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Smith, 186 Okla. 631, 634, 99 P.2d 9o3, 907 (1940).
However, due to variation in the attendant circumstances, one case or a number of like
cases should not automatically determine the results of subsequent cases, "unless the at-
tendant circumstances have first been given due consideration and found not to justify
a rational distinction." Id. at 634, 99 P.zd at 907. Hence, the tendency of some
jurisdictions to classify certain instrumentalities and conditions, e.g., fire, bodies of
water, and high places, as lying beyond the scope of the attractive nuisance doctrine
for one reason or another, ignores the essential importance of the varying circumstances.
See Hudson, supra note 3, at 847-
" It has been urged that the Supreme Court did not contemplate the establishment
of rigid rules or categories, e.g., trespasser, licensee, or invitee, when it first imposed
liability upon the land occupier in Sioux City R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657
(1873). Instead, the opinion envisioned the application of a simple standard of due
care, viewing the decision "as one of the insufficiency of the evidence to base a
finding that the defendant had been negligent with reference to the plaintiff." Hudson,
supra note 3, at 847. It would seem that the courts have sought to avoid the un-
popular imposition upon the land occupier of any duty toward trespassers by employing
categories or fixed rules in place of the standard of due care. But these categories
are inadequate, as is evidenced by their being further subdivided to meet the needs of
the particular case, e.g., technical trespassers, tolerated intruders, bare licensees, implied
licensees, etc. The resulting confusion and uncertainty and the inadequacy of the
categorization method have led to the demand for a more flexible approach to the
problem. Hudson, supra note 3, at 847.
"' RESTATEMFNT, TORTs § 339 (1934). See note 3 supra.
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personal or social utility of the subject activity,40 the relative ease of
providing safeguards against injury,4 1 and the extent to which it was
foreseeable that trespass and ensuing harm would occur.42
"'RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 33 9 d (1934). The courts have long recognized that
certain activities, though dangerous and sometimes harmful to the public, are in the
community's best interests and warrants the law's protection. Hence, the utility of the
instrumentality or condition which causes the injury to the trespassing child must
always be considered in determining the question of liability for the injury. See
Schock v. Ringing Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wash. zd 599, 1o5
P.2d 838 (1940).
" See Hunsche v. Southern Pac. Co., 62 F. Supp. 634 (D.C. Cal. T945) 5 Brown v.
Chesapeake R.R., 135 Ky. 798, 123 S.W. 298 (19o9) ; McCay v. Du Pont Rayon Co.,
20 Tenn. App. 157, 96 S.W.2d 177 (z935).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 a (1934).
In the absence of reasonable foreseeability of the harm's occurring, the majority of
the courts refuse to impose liability. See Hardy v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 266 Fed. 86o
(8th Cir. 1920 ) 5 Jennings v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 369 Pa. 532, 87 A.2d 2o6 (Y952).
